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CUkRENT LEGISLATION
THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX AND SOME CONSTITUTIONAL

SAFEGUARDS.-The Revenue Act of 1936 1 is a combination of two
tax methods, one of which is entirely new in the history of corpora-

tion income tax legislation.2

The Act continues the old method of

taxing normal corporation incomes as determined by the established

tax formula 3 and in addition introduces a new method under which
a surtax is imposed upon corporation profits of each taxable year
where such profits are not distributed as dividends to stockholders.
The admitted purpose of this new method is to force these profits into
the hands of the individual stockholders where they can then be subjected to heavy personal income taxes. 4 The principle upon which
this method is based, that of taxing the real beneficiaries of profits
rather than the nominal recipients, has long been applied in the taxation of fiduciaries, 5 partnerships and syndicates. Partnership and
syndicate profits are treated for purposes of taxation as though constructively received by the partners and syndicate members." The
strength and vitality 7 of the doctrine of corporate entity makes imgenerally in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1935.
'While the method of taxing undistributed profits had been proposed long
before and had been under consideration as early as 1921, it was never
adopted in any of the preceding acts.
'The Act continues the tax on normal income but at graduated rates
instead of at a flat rate as in prior acts.
'It is claimed that such forced distributions when in the hands of the
stockholders will in many cases be subject to surtax rates ranging as high
as 751 on surtax net income. Compare this with the rate of 13y4% on
such profits if they were retained in the corporate treasury.
'The taxation of fiduciaries bears a striking resemblance to the tax on
undistributed profits. This is especially true where the income of the trust
may be either distributed or accumulated in the discretion of the fiduciary.
Such income is taxable to the trust to the extent that it remains undistributed.
It is taxable to the beneficiaries to the extent that it is paid or credited to
them. See REVEN E Acr OF 1936, §§ 161, 162.
'1 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (1934)
09.16. The authors submit this as an example of constructive receipt. This
does not appear to be a true application of the doctrine of constructive receipt. That doctrine rests upon the ground that money is immediately due
and available to the taxpayer and his failure to receive it in cash is due entirely to his own volition. Partnership or syndicate profits are specifically
taxed to the members thereof by the statute, though the profits be neither
available nor distributable and without regard to the doctrine of constructive
receipt. (See 09.02 of same work.)
'Beginning with the historic case Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819), this doctrine has been recognized
and respected by state and federal courts. Its applicability to tax legislation begins with Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup. Ct. 543 (1918).
However, it does not prevent courts from disregarding the corporate form
'Effective
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possible such arbitrary tax imposition upon stockholders. This doctrine receives cautious and respectful consideration in the present and
all prior Acts.8 As a result, Congress was faced with the problem
of how to apply the principle to stockholders without violating the
doctrine. Under prior Acts corporations were free to distribute or
withhold profits from stockholders. Their discretion was tempered
only by the requirement of reasonableness. 9 The President was, however, now determined to close up this great legal loophole.' 0 He demanded that the profits so withheld be forced into the hands of their
true beneficiaries so that the high surtax rates on individual incomes
could operate upon them. The tax on undistributed profits is the
President's contribution toward the solution of this problem. By taxing profits withheld from stockholders at graduated surtax rates ranging from 7 to 27 per cent the Act makes the withholding of corporation profits an extremely unprofitable practice.
Aside from the practical difficulty 11 of distributing as dividends
each year every dollar that the corporation earns, many corporations,
both large and small, are bound by all sorts of legal restrictions against
payment of dividends. Contractual obligations, provisions of state
statutes, charter provisions and by-laws often impose strict prohibitions and restrictions upon dividend distributions. These facts seem
to require no explanation. Yet Congress has seen fit to all but ignore
them. Bitter protest has resulted only in some unsatisfactory concessions. Thus, where the corporation cannot distribute its income without violating a provision of a written contract executed by the corporation prior to May 31, 1936, which provision expressly deals with
the payment of dividends, it is entitled to a credit in computing the
12
amount of profits remaining undistributed and subject to surtax.
Similarly if the written contract, though not containing terms of prohibition, expressly deals with the disposition of the earnings and profits
of the taxable year and requires them to be paid or irrevocably set
aside in discharge of a debt, a credit is allowed to the extent that such
where fraud or evasion were the purposes of its creation. See U. S. v.
Milwaukee
Co., 142 Fed. 247 (E. D. Wis. 1905).
8
A separate and distinct tax on corporation profits is imposed upon the
corporation, while the stockholder computes his income without regard to
corporation profits.
'Section 102, Revenue Act of 1935, imposed a surtax upon improperly accumulating corporate surplus. This section is continued in the Revenue Act of 1936 and is in addition to all other taxes.
"The President's message to Congress, N. Y. Times, March 3rd, 1936,
in which he estimates that a loss of over a billion dollars a year resulted
from the wilful withholding of corporation profits by controlling stockholders. He termed this the greatest loophole in all prior acts.
"Some of the practical considerations which have been entirely ignored
by Congress are:
a-Nothing is left for necessary reserves.
b-Corporation profits hardly ever are represented by cash, but most
often in a going business are reflected in inventories and other
assets not readily convertible into cash.
"1REVENUE AcT oF 1936 §26, (c) (1).
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amount has been paid or set aside. 13 These credits are further qualified to preclude a taking
14 of a double credit in cases where both types
of restrictions prevail.
The discussion which follows undertakes only to raise a few of
the Constitutional problems which the Act seems to create and to suggest in a limited way the probable direction in which their solution
lies. No attempt is made to give full consideration to the problems
treated.
"When a corporation is organized under a general enabling act,
its charter consists of the provisions of the existing state constitution,
the particular statute under which it is formed and all other general
laws which are made applicable to corporations formed thereunder
and of the articles of association or incorporation filed thereunder * * *." 15 The right of incorporation conferred by a general
law is after acceptance in the nature-of a contract which cannot be
avoided without the consent of the parties. Therefore a reservation
in the state constitution, 6 or in any of the statutes which become part
of the charter, 17 constitute assent in advance by the parties to alteration or repeal by the state legislature and the prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts by the states which is set forth
in the Constitution of the United States does not apply.18 No similar
prohibition restricts federal legislation. Congress when dealing with
a subject lying within its control cannot be bound by contracts between private parties and contract obligations of states and municipalities and it may expressly prohibit and invalidate contract provisions which interfere with the carrying out of its policy, unless its
action in such respect is so arbitrary and capricious as to invoke the
protection of the 5th Amendment.' 9
In view of the facts stated in the preceding paragraph we might
well confine ourselves to the conclusion that the Act cannot be successfully attacked on the ground that it violates the Constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts. However, we ought not
to leave this question without inquiring into the nature of the impairment, if any, caused by the Act. Impairment results when a corporation having a deficit distributes its current year's profits in violation
of a prohibition contained in the state's general or penal statutes. A
careful reading of the Act fails to disclose any legal compulsion upon
the taxpayer to distribute dividends in violation of its charter. The
burden imposed by the Act is the payment of taxes not dividends.
There is no attempt to prescribe a course of conduct for the taxpayer.
REvENuE AcT oF 1936 § 26, (C) (2).
REvEz F AcT OF 1936 § 26, (c) (3).

14 C. J. § 108.
"11N. Y.

CoNsT. ART. 8

§ 1.

'7N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW Art. 2,

§ 5.

"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 533 (U. S.

1819).

"Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co., 294 U. S. 40, 55 Sup. Ct. 103

(1935).
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It is free to distribute or withhold profits. The purpose and policy
of the Act is the same as that of all preceding revenue acts; it attempts only to raise revenues.
The provisions of the Federal Constitution which apply to the
taxation of income are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1.
Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3.
The 16th Amendment.
The 5th Amendment.

The first provision above enumerated states that, "Congress shall
have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises."
The power of Congress to levy income taxes rests solely upon this
provision. A great deal of confusion has resulted from the misconception that the 16th Amendment is the source of this power. That
Amendment provides that, "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." This provision does not create the power
to tax income. It recognizes the existence of that power and merely
attempts to free it from2 the requirement of apportionment set forth
in Art. 1, Sec. 2, Cl. 3. 0
Differences of opinion exist as to whether a tax on gross income
before allowance for business expenses would constitute a tax on income within the original Constitution and the 16th Amendment. Art.
1, Sec. 8, Cl. 1, does not use that term nor does the Amendment
define or distinguish between one kind of income and another. For
our purpose it is sufficient to note that the Act does allow the deduction of business expenses in the determination of taxable income.
The undistributed profits tax uses as its base the taxable income determined after deduction of business expenses. 21 Therefore no question can be raised as to whether the tax is upon such income as is
within the meaning of the Constitution.
Another question which suggests itself is whether the restrictions contained in the general laws 22 and in the penal codes 23 of the
several states against the payment of dividends from capital is a contract obligation within the meaning of the sections 24 of the Act which
grant credits where contract obligations relating to dividends exist.
The Treasury Department in its capacity as official interpreter of the
Act has taken a definite stand on this question.2 5 It does not recog1

Brushabel v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236 (1916);
PAUL AND MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
1 REVENUE AcT OF 1936 § 14, (a) (2), (b).
IN. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 58.
I N. Y. PENAL LAW § 664.
REVENUE ACT OF 1936 §26, (c)(1) (2) (3).

T. D. 4674 Art. 26-3 (a).

(1934) 04.06.
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nize the charter of the corporation as a contract restricting the payment of dividends within the intent of the Act. In view of the opinion
expressed in preceding paragraphs that no impairment of contract
obligation is involved, this decision would seem to be quite proper.
Since Congress cannot be bound by contract obligations and since in
fact no contract obligation is impaired, it could have expressly ignored these restrictions. Despite the failure to express its intention
in unequivocal terms there can be no doubt that such intention is
manifested by a fair reading of the Act. That the refusal to recognize such obligations may result in inequality and discrimination under
the 5th Amendment is, however, an entirely different question.
The 5th Amendment to the Constitution declares that no person
shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Does the Act discriminate between equal classes of taxpayers?
Is the corporation with a deficit which is compelled to pay the surtax
through its inability to defy charter restrictions against dividends from
capital, discriminated against when the corporation with a surplus
may avoid the tax? Are all corporations, subject to the undistributed profits tax, equal classes of taxpayers? A corporation may
under the income tax formula have a profit which in fact does not
exist due to losses and expenditures not allowed by law. If the profit
as computed under the tax formula is not distributed it will be subject to the surtax though no profit exists which can be distributed.
Highly arbitrary discrimination between equal classes of taxpayers is undoubtedly a violation of the "due process" clause. On
the other hand, "A statute is not unconstitutional under the 'due
process' clause unless it is so arbitrary and capricious that it constrains to the conclusion that it is not the exercise of taxation, but a
confiscation of property. In other words a statute is not unconstitutional unless it is so wanting in a basis for classification as to produce
a gross and patent inequality." 26 Accordingly, it has been held to be
not unconstitutional to discriminate between corporations and individuas, 2 7 domestic corporations and foreign corporations,2 8 and partners and individuals,2 9 for tax purposes.
CONCLUSION.

The power to tax is also the power to destroy. Constitutional
safeguards limit this power but it nevertheless remains a broad and
far reaching one. The continuation and very existence of the fed"1

PAUL AND MERTENS,

LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

(1934)

04.08.-7Flint v. Stone-Tracey Co., 220 U. S. 107, 35 Sup. Ct. 342 (1911);

24 HARv. L. REv. (1910-11).
'Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 45 Sup. Ct. 348 (1924);
Nat'l Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 270 U. S. 630, 46 Sup. Ct. 335 (1925).
'Wni. Grey, 13 B. T. A. 51, 53, aff'd, 35 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 4th,
1929).
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eral government depend upon this power. Therefore, the Supreme
Court has not hesitated to disregard fine-drawn distinctions reaching
into infinity. Unless the sections relating to undistributed profits flagrantly violate all tests under the 5th Amendment the entire Act must
be declared constitutional.
SAMUEL B. POLLACK.

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE SEAL ON AN INSTRUMENT.-The

New York Legislature in recent enactments hastened the final destruction of the common-law effects of a seal on a written instrument. One of the statutory changes is the new Section 342 of the
Civil Practice Act, which reads as follows:
"1. A seal upon a written instrument hereafter executed
shall not be received as conclusive or presumptive evidence of
consideration. A written instrument, hereafter executed, which
changes or modifies or which discharges in whole or in part
a sealed instrument shall not be deemed invalid or ineffectual
because of the absence of a seal thereon. A sealed instrument
may not be changed, modified or discharged by an executory
agreement unless such agreement is in writing and signed by
the party against whom it is sought to enforce the change,
modification or discharge. A sealed instrument so changed
or modified shall continue to be construed as an instrument
under seal.

"2. The rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal
under any sealed instrument hereafter executed shall be the
same as if the instrument had not been sealed." 1
Through the years, regulations concerning the seal became embedded in our statutory law. Instances of this may be seen in the
necessity of a seal on public documents, on certificates issued by
public officers, and on statutory bonds. 2 The seals that are thus required by statute remain unaffected by the recent legislation.
'N. Y. LAWS 1936. c. 685.
2 N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT § 330.
A writ of habeas corpin, must be issued
under the seal of the court awarding it. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1236. A certified copy of a record kept by a court or officer having a seal must be admitted
into evidence if certified under the hand and seal of such court or officer.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 382. Courts of record are required to have seals.
N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 28. The seal kept by the county clerk of each county
shall continue to be the seal of the Supreme Court in that county, N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 158, except New York County where the seal of the county clerk
shall continue to be the seal of the county court. N. Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 194.
An order under the Agriculture and Markets Law must have the official seal
attached thereon. N. Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAW §§ 15, 36. N. Y.
EDUCATION LAW § 25. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 15. N. Y. INS. LAW § 4. N. Y.
EXECUTIVE LAW § 74. N. Y. TAX LAW § 172. N. Y. SuRR. CT. AT §§ 3, 31.
N. Y. C. MUNI. CT. CODE § 143, (2). N. Y. BANKING LAW § 11.

